Asian School of Cyber Laws

Cyber Security for Pharmaceutical Companies: Threats, Case Studies and a Practical Defence Framework

On 4 May 2026, West Pharmaceutical Services, a company that makes the vials, stoppers, syringe components and injection devices used by drug makers around the world, spotted unusual activity on its network. Attackers had stolen data and encrypted systems. West took its systems offline globally, and shipping, receiving and manufacturing stopped at multiple sites while it recovered.

Most people have never heard of West. But a huge number of injectable medicines depend on its components. An attack on one specialised supplier rippled straight into the pharmaceutical supply chain.

Pharmaceutical companies hold some of the most valuable intellectual property on earth, run tightly controlled manufacturing plants and sit at the heart of supply chains that patients depend on. That makes them a target for spies, ransomware gangs and data thieves alike.

This guide covers why pharmaceutical companies are targeted, where they are exposed, what real attacks have taught us, and how to build a practical defence.

1. Why pharmaceutical companies are a prime target

The consequences go beyond lost revenue: drug shortages, delayed clinical trials, compromised product quality and patients who can't get the medicines they need.

The numbers

2. The unique attack surface

The pharmaceutical attack surface

Research

Discovery and trials

  • Lab systems and instruments
  • Clinical trial data
  • Research collaborations
  • Regulatory submissions

Manufacturing

Making medicines

  • Manufacturing execution systems
  • Process control and PLCs
  • Quality and batch records
  • Cold storage and environment

Supply chain

Getting medicines to patients

  • Ingredient and component suppliers
  • Contract manufacturers and labs
  • Distributors and wholesalers
  • Cloud and IT providers
Entry points across the business
Phishing emailCompromised software updatesPartner and supplier accessVendor remote access to plantsUnpatched systemsInsiders

Research

Research and development depends on lab information systems, connected instruments, huge data sets and constant collaboration with universities, contract research organisations and partners. Clinical trials involve patient data from sites around the world. All of this is valuable to competitors and foreign states.

Manufacturing

Modern pharmaceutical plants run on manufacturing execution systems, process control systems and PLCs, with strict electronic batch records and quality systems. Everything must be validated, so changing or patching a system can require lengthy testing. Cold storage and environmental controls protect products that must be kept at precise temperatures.

Supply chain

Drug makers rely on suppliers of active ingredients, components and packaging, contract manufacturers, testing labs and distributors. Many are specialists with few alternatives. When one goes down, production lines elsewhere can stop.

Problems that cut across the industry

3. Major threats facing pharmaceutical companies

Intellectual property theft

State-sponsored groups target research data, formulas, trial results and manufacturing processes. These intrusions are quiet and can last for years.

Ransomware

Ransomware can stop manufacturing, shipping and research. Because production systems often depend on IT systems for batch records, scheduling and quality, an attack on IT can halt the plant even if production equipment is untouched.

Data extortion

Some groups skip encryption and simply steal data, then demand payment to keep it private. Patient and trial data make this particularly damaging.

Supply chain attacks

Attacks on suppliers, contract manufacturers and distributors can disrupt the flow of ingredients, components and finished medicines.

Destructive malware

Malware designed to destroy rather than extort, often spread by state actors, can cause massive damage to companies that were never the intended target.

Data integrity attacks

Altering research data, batch records or quality data could undermine trust in medicines or lead to unsafe products reaching patients. Even the suspicion of tampering can force products to be quarantined.

Disinformation

Stolen documents can be doctored and leaked to undermine public trust in medicines and vaccines.

4. How an attack reaches the production line

How an attack moves from an inbox to the production line
  1. IT
    Corporate networkEmail, ERP, research collaboration tools
    1Phishing, stolen credentials or a poisoned update
  2. DMZ
    IT/OT boundaryConnections between business and plant systems
    2Weak separation lets the attacker reach the plant
  3. MES
    Manufacturing and quality systemsMES, electronic batch records, lab systems
    3Batch records and scheduling are encrypted
  4. Control
    Process controlPLCs, SCADA, environmental monitoring
    4Lines stop; product integrity is in doubt
  5. Supply
    Medicines and patientsFinished products, distribution, hospitals
    !Shortages, quarantined batches, delayed treatment

In pharmaceutical manufacturing, production can't legally continue without trustworthy batch records and quality data. So an attack that encrypts manufacturing and quality systems can stop production just as effectively as one that hits the machines themselves.

5. Case studies: what real attacks have taught us

Eight attacks that shaped pharmaceutical security
  1. 2017
    Merck and NotPetya

    Destructive malware disrupted manufacturing, research and sales worldwide.

    You can be collateral damage.

  2. 2019
    Eurofins Scientific

    Ransomware at a testing giant disrupted forensic and lab work.

    Labs are critical suppliers.

  3. 2020
    Dr. Reddy's

    A cyber attack forced an Indian drug maker to isolate data centres worldwide.

    Pandemic research drew attackers.

  4. 2020
    European Medicines Agency

    Hackers stole and leaked COVID-19 vaccine documents.

    Data can be weaponised against trust.

  5. 2024
    Cencora

    A drug distributor reportedly paid a record 75 million dollar ransom.

    Data theft alone can cost a fortune.

  6. 2024
    Octapharma Plasma

    Ransomware closed plasma donation centres across the US.

    Raw material supply is at risk too.

  7. 2025
    Inotiv

    Ransomware disrupted a drug research company's operations.

    Research services are targets.

  8. 2026
    West Pharmaceutical Services

    Ransomware halted manufacturing at a key component supplier.

    Specialist suppliers are single points of failure.

Merck and NotPetya (2017)

In June 2017, NotPetya, destructive malware disguised as ransomware and widely attributed to Russian military intelligence, spread from a compromised update to Ukrainian accounting software. Merck, one of the world's largest drug makers, was caught in the blast: more than 40,000 computers across its global network were infected, and manufacturing, research and sales were all disrupted. Production problems contributed to Merck having to borrow doses of its HPV vaccine from a US government stockpile. Merck later sought 1.4 billion dollars from its insurers, and settled a long legal battle with them in 2024.

The lesson: A pharmaceutical company doesn't need to be the target to suffer enormous damage. Software updates from suppliers in any country can carry malware, and segmentation limits how far it can spread.

Eurofins Scientific (2019)

In June 2019, ransomware hit Eurofins Scientific, one of the world's largest testing laboratory groups, which provides testing services to pharmaceutical, food and environmental companies, and forensic services to police. In the UK, police had to suspend work with Eurofins' forensic services, delaying criminal cases. Eurofins reportedly paid a ransom to restore its systems.

The lesson: Testing and lab service providers are critical links in the pharmaceutical supply chain. Drug makers need to know how their labs would cope with an attack.

Dr. Reddy's (2020)

In October 2020, Dr. Reddy's Laboratories, a major Indian generic drug maker, suffered a cyber attack shortly after receiving approval to run late-stage trials of Russia's Sputnik V COVID-19 vaccine in India. The company isolated all its data centre services, and operations at some of its plants were affected while it recovered.

The lesson: High-profile research attracts attackers. Companies involved in strategically important work need heightened security during that period.

European Medicines Agency (2020)

In December 2020, hackers broke into the European Medicines Agency, the EU's drug regulator, and accessed documents relating to the Pfizer and BioNTech COVID-19 vaccine submitted for approval. Some of the stolen documents were later leaked online, and the agency said some of the leaked correspondence had been manipulated before publication in a way that could undermine trust in vaccines.

The lesson: Pharmaceutical data shared with regulators and partners is only as secure as the weakest organisation holding it. Stolen data can also be doctored and used for disinformation.

Cencora (2024)

In February 2024, Cencora, one of the largest drug distributors in the United States, disclosed that data had been stolen from its systems, including personal and health information. Bloomberg later reported that Cencora paid 75 million dollars to the Dark Angels group, the largest known ransom payment at the time, apparently to stop the stolen data from being published. Researchers said the group hadn't deployed ransomware on the network, relying on data theft alone.

The lesson: Attackers don't need to encrypt anything to cause huge losses. Detecting and stopping large-scale data theft is as important as preventing ransomware.

Octapharma Plasma (2024)

In April 2024, Octapharma Plasma, which collects blood plasma used to make medicines for patients with immune deficiencies, bleeding disorders and other conditions, temporarily closed its US plasma donation centres after a cyber attack linked to the BlackSuit ransomware group.

The lesson: The supply of raw biological materials is part of the pharmaceutical supply chain, and it can be disrupted by attacks on collection operations.

Inotiv (2025)

In August 2025, Inotiv, a contract research company that provides drug development and research services to pharmaceutical companies, disclosed that ransomware had encrypted some of its systems and data, disrupting business operations. It moved some operations to offline alternatives to keep working. The Qilin ransomware group claimed the attack.

The lesson: Contract research organisations hold sensitive data from many clients. Drug makers should assess their partners' security and their ability to keep research going during an attack.

West Pharmaceutical Services (2026)

On 4 May 2026, West Pharmaceutical Services, a major supplier of injectable drug packaging and delivery systems, detected an intrusion. Its filing to US regulators said data had been stolen and systems encrypted. West took systems offline globally, disrupting shipping, receiving and manufacturing at multiple sites. Within about a week, it had restored core systems and restarted critical processes at some sites, while working with customers to minimise delays.

The lesson: Specialist suppliers with few alternatives are single points of failure. Drug makers need to know which suppliers they depend on most and hold contingency stock or alternative sources.

6. A practical defence framework

Defence in depth for pharmaceutical companies
Governance, people and partnersBoard oversight, training, supplier and partner risk
Identity and accessPhishing-resistant MFA, privileged access, controlled vendor access
SegmentationSeparate research, manufacturing, OT and corporate networks
Monitoring and detectionIT and OT monitoring, data loss detection, integrity checks
ResilienceOffline backups, validated recovery, contingency stock
Medicines and patients

Protect the crown jewels

Identify the research, trial and manufacturing data that matters most. Restrict who can access it, encrypt it, and monitor for unusual access and large data transfers.

Separate manufacturing from IT

Put a properly designed DMZ between corporate IT and manufacturing networks, and divide plant networks into zones. Make sure manufacturing can keep running, at least for a while, if corporate IT is lost.

Secure validated systems

Build security into validation from the start, so that patches and changes can be applied in a planned, timely way. Where systems can't be patched, use segmentation, allowlisting and strict access control to protect them.

Lock down identity and remote access

Protect data integrity

Use controls that make tampering with research data, batch records and quality data detectable, such as audit trails, checksums and restricted write access. Back up records in ways that preserve their integrity.

Manage supplier and partner risk

Identify the suppliers, contract manufacturers, labs and distributors you can't operate without. Assess their security, require incident notification, and keep contingency stock or alternative sources for critical items.

Detect data theft

Monitor for unusual outbound data transfers and access to sensitive repositories. Many of the most expensive incidents involve data theft without encryption.

Back up and plan recovery

Keep offline, tested backups of IT, manufacturing and quality systems, including configurations and validated software. Plan how to restore validated systems quickly and how to verify product quality after an incident.

Test, exercise and share

7. Incident response for pharmaceutical companies

Incident response flow for a pharmaceutical incident
  1. DetectSecurity alert, system failure, partner or supplier notification
  2. TriageAre manufacturing, quality or patient data affected? Is product integrity at risk?
  3. Halt production?
    YesStop affected lines, quarantine batches made during the incident
    NoIsolate IT, keep validated production running with manual records
  4. ContainIsolate affected systems and partners, preserve evidence
  5. Eradicate and recoverRestore validated systems from clean backups
  6. Verify qualityConfirm data integrity and product quality before release
  7. LearnFix root causes and update plans

Involve quality from the start

In pharmaceutical incidents, the quality function decides whether products made during or after an incident can be released. Quality leaders must be part of the response team, not informed afterwards.

Protect product integrity

If there is any chance that manufacturing or quality data was altered, affected batches may need to be quarantined and investigated before release. Plans should define how this will be done.

Keep medicines flowing

Work with distributors, hospitals and health authorities to prioritise critical medicines and manage potential shortages.

Communicate

Customers, partners, health authorities and, where relevant, patients need clear and accurate information. Be prepared for stolen data to be leaked or manipulated, and ready to respond to disinformation.

8. Governance and culture

9. Emerging issues

AI in drug discovery

AI models and the data used to train them are becoming core intellectual property, and new targets for theft and tampering.

Smart factories

Continuous manufacturing, connected equipment and cloud-based manufacturing systems improve efficiency but expand the attack surface in plants.

Decentralised clinical trials

Trials that use apps, wearables and remote monitoring collect sensitive data from patients' homes, outside traditional controls.

Biotech and cell therapies

Personalised therapies depend on tightly coordinated, digitally tracked logistics between patients, hospitals and manufacturing sites, where any disruption can affect individual patients directly.

10. Checklist: 20 questions every pharmaceutical company should ask

Use these questions to test your current position. Any question you can't answer with a confident yes is a place to start.

Download the checklist (PDF)

Visibility

  1. Do we know where our most valuable research and manufacturing data is stored?
  2. Do we have an inventory of manufacturing and lab systems, including software versions?
  3. Do we know which suppliers and partners we can't operate without?

Access

  1. Is phishing-resistant MFA used for staff, administrators and partners?
  2. Is vendor access to plants enabled only when needed and monitored?
  3. Is access to sensitive research and trial data restricted and reviewed?

Network

  1. Is there a DMZ between corporate IT and manufacturing networks?
  2. Could our plants keep running if corporate IT were lost?
  3. Are unpatchable validated systems protected by other controls?

Detection

  1. Do we monitor manufacturing networks as well as IT?
  2. Would we detect large amounts of research or patient data leaving the network?
  3. Would we detect tampering with batch records or quality data?

Resilience

  1. Are backups of IT, manufacturing and quality systems stored offline and tested?
  2. Can we restore validated systems quickly after an attack?
  3. Do we hold contingency stock or alternatives for critical supplies?

Response

  1. Is the quality function part of our cyber incident response team?
  2. Do we know how we would assess product integrity after an attack?
  3. Have we run an exercise involving manufacturing and quality in the last 12 months?

People and governance

  1. Are researchers and plant staff trained on phishing and data handling?
  2. Does the board treat cyber risk as a risk to supply, quality and patients?

Conclusion

The pharmaceutical industry is built on rigorous quality control, validation and attention to detail. Cyber attacks now test those disciplines in new ways: by stealing years of research in an afternoon, halting validated production lines, or striking a specialist supplier that nobody had thought about.

The defences are known. Protect the crown jewels. Separate manufacturing from IT. Build security into validation. Guard data integrity. Know your critical suppliers, and plan for their failure.

In pharmaceuticals, cyber security is product quality.

Sources

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