Asian School of Cyber Laws

Cyber Security for Ports and Shipping: Threats, Case Studies and a Practical Defence Framework

On a Friday in November 2023, DP World Australia noticed something wrong in its computer systems. It disconnected them from the internet, and four of the country's biggest container terminals in Sydney, Melbourne, Brisbane and Fremantle stopped moving freight.

Ships could still unload. But trucks couldn't get in or out of the terminals, because the gate systems that tell drivers which container to collect were offline. Within days, around 30,000 containers were stuck on the wharves, some of them holding perishable goods. Australia's national cyber security coordinator called it a nationally significant cyber incident.

No cranes were hacked. No ships were hijacked. A single attack on a terminal operator's IT systems was enough to choke a significant share of a country's container trade.

Around 80% of global trade by volume travels by sea. Ports and shipping companies sit at the centre of almost every supply chain on earth, and they have become one of the most attacked parts of the global economy. This guide covers why, where the industry is exposed, what real attacks have taught us, and how to build a practical defence.

1. Why ports and shipping are a prime target

Ports and shipping companies are valuable to almost every kind of attacker.

The consequences go far beyond the port gate. Empty shelves, factory shutdowns, rotting food, missed fuel deliveries and, at sea, ships running aground.

The numbers

These figures come from individual companies' datasets rather than a single official count, but every source points the same way.

2. The unique attack surface

The maritime industry is not one target. It is a chain of ships, terminals and logistics businesses, each with its own technology and weaknesses.

The maritime attack surface

At sea

Ships and fleets

  • Navigation (GPS, ECDIS, AIS)
  • Engine and ballast control
  • Satellite communications
  • Crew Wi-Fi and devices

In port

Ports and terminals

  • Terminal operating systems
  • Cranes and automated equipment
  • Gate and truck booking systems
  • Port community systems

On land

Logistics and trade

  • Shipping line booking platforms
  • Freight forwarders and agents
  • Customs and cargo data exchange
  • Payments and invoicing
Entry points across the chain
Phishing emailVendor remote accessGPS jamming and spoofingInfected USB drivesShared platformsInsiders

At sea: ships and fleets

A modern ship is a floating network. Navigation relies on satellite positioning, electronic chart systems (ECDIS) and the automatic identification system (AIS) that broadcasts the ship's position. Engines, steering, ballast and cargo systems are increasingly computer controlled. Ships connect to the shore over satellite links, often with remote access for equipment makers, and carry crew Wi-Fi and personal devices on the same vessel. Many ships also run old operating systems that can't easily be updated at sea.

In port: ports and terminals

A container terminal runs on its terminal operating system, the software that tracks every container, plans where it goes in the yard and tells cranes and trucks what to do next. Around it sit gate systems, truck booking systems, automated cranes and vehicles, and the port community systems that let shipping lines, customs, forwarders and hauliers exchange data. Lose the terminal operating system and the terminal often has to stop or fall back to slow, manual processes.

On land: logistics and trade

Behind every ship and terminal is a web of shipping lines, freight forwarders, customs brokers, ship agents, hauliers and warehouses, all exchanging bookings, cargo details and payments. This is where ransomware often starts, and where fraud is most common.

Problems that cut across the chain

3. Major threats facing ports and shipping

Ransomware on terminals and shipping lines

Ransomware is the most common disruptive threat to the industry. Terminal operators and port authorities are particularly attractive because their systems coordinate everything that moves through the port. Even when cranes and ships are untouched, losing the systems that track containers and let trucks in can stop a terminal for days.

GPS jamming and spoofing

Ships depend on satellite positioning. Jamming drowns out the signal, while spoofing feeds the receiver false positions. In the Gulf, the Red Sea, the Black Sea and the Baltic, ships have reported positions that placed them on land, at airports or miles from their real location. Spoofing can also corrupt AIS data, so other ships and authorities see a false picture of traffic. For a ship in narrow or shallow waters, a wrong position can mean a grounding or collision.

Attacks on shipboard systems

Navigation, propulsion, steering and ballast systems are increasingly connected. Malware arriving on a USB drive used to update electronic charts, or through a vendor's remote connection, can disrupt systems the crew depends on to keep the ship safe, far from any IT support.

Cargo theft and smuggling

Organised crime groups hack port and logistics systems to find where containers are, change their status and obtain the codes needed to collect them. They then send their own drivers to pick up containers holding drugs, or steal valuable cargo outright.

Supply chain and shared platform attacks

A single compromised software supplier, port community system or freight platform can expose every company that uses it. Attackers increasingly target these shared systems because one intrusion reaches many victims.

Payment fraud and business email compromise

Shipping involves constant payments for freight, port charges, fuel and demurrage between companies that often only know each other by email. Fraudsters hijack or impersonate these conversations to redirect payments to their own accounts.

State-sponsored espionage and pre-positioning

Ports handle military cargo and sensitive trade information. Intelligence agencies have warned that state-sponsored groups are getting into transport and maritime networks, not only to spy but to be ready to disrupt them in a future conflict.

Insiders

Port workers, drivers and crew can be bribed or coerced by criminal groups to plant devices, share passwords or release containers.

4. How an attack reaches the quayside

Most serious attacks on ports don't start with the cranes. They start with an email, a stolen password or a supplier's connection, and work their way towards the systems that move containers.

How an attack moves from an inbox to the quayside
  1. IT
    Corporate networkEmail, finance, HR, internet access
    1Phishing email or stolen VPN password
  2. Shared
    Shared platformsPort community systems, partner and customs links
    2Weak separation lets the attacker spread
  3. Ops
    Terminal operating systemContainer tracking, yard and vessel planning
    3Ransomware encrypts the system that runs the terminal
  4. Control
    Equipment and gatesCranes, automated vehicles, gate and booking systems
    4Equipment has no instructions; gates close
  5. Physical
    Cargo movementShips, trucks, trains, containers
    !Containers stranded, ships delayed, supply chains stall

Notice that the attacker never needs to touch a crane. Taking out the system that tells the cranes what to do is enough. That is why the terminal operating system, and the ability to work without it, sits at the heart of port cyber security.

Why ships are especially hard to secure

5. Case studies: what real attacks have taught us

Nine incidents that shaped maritime security
  1. 2011
    Port of Antwerp

    Drug traffickers hacked port systems to collect containers holding cocaine.

    Cargo data is worth money to criminals.

  2. 2017
    Maersk and NotPetya

    Destructive malware wiped the world's largest shipping line's IT.

    You may be collateral damage in someone else's war.

  3. 2021
    Transnet, South Africa

    A cyber attack forced manual operations at the country's container terminals.

    Practised manual fallback keeps cargo moving.

  4. 2023
    Port of Nagoya, Japan

    Ransomware stopped Japan's busiest port for about two days.

    One shared terminal system is a single point of failure.

  5. 2023
    DP World Australia

    Four terminals stopped and about 30,000 containers were stranded.

    Disconnecting is safe, but you need a plan for what comes next.

  6. 2024
    Port of Seattle

    Ransomware hit both the seaport and Seattle-Tacoma airport.

    Refusing to pay is easier with tested recovery.

  7. 2025
    MSC Antonia

    A container ship ran aground in the Red Sea after GPS interference.

    Navigation signals can't be trusted blindly.

  8. 2026
    Strait of Hormuz

    Over 1,100 ships hit by GPS jamming in a day after war broke out.

    Conflict turns navigation into a target.

  9. 2026
    Port of Tanjung Pelepas

    A cyber attack halted one of Asia's largest container terminals overnight.

    Even the biggest hubs are not immune.

Port of Antwerp (2011 to 2013)

For around two years, a drug trafficking gang based in the Netherlands used hackers to break into IT systems at the Port of Antwerp. The hackers emailed malware to port staff and later installed devices to give them remote access. With access to logistics data, they could see where specific containers were and obtain the codes needed to release them, then send their own drivers to collect containers before the legitimate owners arrived. Police in Belgium and the Netherlands broke up the operation in 2013, seizing large quantities of cocaine and heroin.

The lesson: Port data has direct criminal value. The codes and records that control who can collect a container need the same protection as money.

Maersk and NotPetya (2017)

In June 2017, NotPetya, destructive malware disguised as ransomware and widely attributed to Russian military intelligence, spread from a compromised Ukrainian accounting software update. Maersk, the world's largest container shipping company at the time, was caught in the blast. The malware destroyed tens of thousands of computers and thousands of servers, and Maersk terminals around the world fell back to manual processes. Recovery depended partly on luck: a domain controller in Ghana had been offline during a power cut, leaving one clean copy of critical network data. Maersk rebuilt its global IT in about ten days and estimated the cost at 250 to 300 million dollars.

The lesson: A shipping company doesn't need to be the target to be devastated. Recovery shouldn't depend on luck: offline copies of critical systems, especially identity systems, are essential.

Transnet, South Africa (2021)

In July 2021, a cyber attack hit Transnet, South Africa's state-owned port and rail operator. Its port terminals division declared force majeure at container terminals in Durban, Ngqura, Port Elizabeth and Cape Town, citing a cyber attack, security intrusion and sabotage. Durban alone handles around 60% of the country's container traffic. Terminals kept working by switching to manual processes, but at much lower speed, causing congestion that took time to clear.

The lesson: Manual fallback procedures can keep a port operating, but only if staff know how to use them. They need to be written down and practised.

Port of Nagoya, Japan (2023)

In July 2023, ransomware hit the Nagoya United Terminal System, the shared system that runs all five container terminals at Japan's busiest port. The ransom note reportedly came out of an office printer. Container loading and unloading stopped and trailers queued at the gates. The port had hoped to restart the next day, but recovery took longer than planned. The LockBit ransomware group claimed responsibility, and the port authority said it didn't pay.

The lesson: When every terminal in a port shares one system, one attack stops them all. Shared systems need extra protection and a recovery plan sized for the whole port.

DP World Australia (2023)

In November 2023, DP World Australia detected an intrusion and disconnected its systems from the internet to contain it. That decision stopped the attack spreading, but it also froze its terminals in Sydney, Melbourne, Brisbane and Fremantle for around three days, because trucks couldn't enter or leave. About 30,000 containers were stranded, and data about current and former employees was stolen.

The lesson: Disconnecting from the internet is often the right call, but it has consequences. Ports need a plan for operating, and communicating with customers, while systems are offline.

Port of Seattle (2024)

In August 2024, the Rhysida ransomware group attacked the Port of Seattle, which runs both the city's seaport and Seattle-Tacoma International Airport. At the airport, baggage handling, flight information screens, ticketing and the website were disrupted for days, and the port's maritime facilities were also affected. The port refused to pay the ransom. Rhysida published stolen data, and the port later notified around 90,000 people that their personal information had been compromised.

The lesson: Refusing to pay is far easier when recovery has been planned and tested. Organisations that run several kinds of infrastructure need to keep them separated, so one attack doesn't take down everything.

MSC Antonia (2025)

On 10 May 2025, the 7,000-container ship MSC Antonia ran aground on the Eliza Shoals south of Jeddah in the Red Sea, after veering off its planned route. The day before, the UK Maritime Trade Operations centre had warned of electronic interference in the area. Analysts at Windward and later Pole Star linked the grounding to GPS interference. Windward had recorded more than 180 ships affected by interference in the region in the first quarter of 2025 alone.

The lesson: Crews must be able to recognise when navigation data is wrong and check their position using radar, visual bearings and other independent methods.

Strait of Hormuz (2026)

After the US and Israeli strikes on Iran on 28 February 2026, GPS jamming and spoofing around the Strait of Hormuz surged. More than 1,100 ships were reported affected within 24 hours, some showing positions on land, at airports or at power plants. Combined with the wider conflict, tanker traffic through the strait fell sharply in the following days. Analysts also warned that false AIS positions were making traffic data itself unreliable.

The lesson: In a conflict, satellite navigation becomes contested. Shipping companies need procedures for operating safely without trusting GPS in high-risk areas.

Port of Tanjung Pelepas (2026)

Late on 9 September 2026, the Port of Tanjung Pelepas in Malaysia, one of the largest container terminals in Southeast Asia, detected a cyber security incident. It isolated affected systems as a precaution, temporarily halting container terminal operations. A phased restart began the next day, with some processes handled manually, and the port reported full restoration of systems about a week later. A ransomware group called Direwolf later claimed responsibility, although the port did not confirm who was behind it.

The lesson: Fast detection and isolation, followed by a planned restart with manual workarounds, can turn a potential multi-week outage into an overnight one.

6. A practical defence framework

No single control will protect a port or a fleet. The aim is defence in depth: multiple layers, so that when one fails, the next one stops the attacker.

Defence in depth for ports and shipping
Governance, people and partnersBoard oversight, crew and staff training, vendor risk
AccessMFA, controlled vendor and remote access, privileged accounts
SegmentationSeparate business, operations, navigation and crew networks
Monitoring and detectionShip and shore monitoring, GNSS interference alerts
ResilienceOffline backups, manual procedures, independent navigation
Ships, cranes and cargo

Know what you have, on every ship and in every terminal

Build an inventory of systems on each vessel and at each terminal: navigation and engine systems, terminal operating systems, cranes, gates, network devices and every connection to the outside world, including satellite links and vendor access.

Segment networks

On ships, separate business IT, navigation and machinery systems, vendor connections and crew internet. In terminals, separate the terminal operating system and equipment networks from corporate IT and from shared platforms. Control and monitor every connection between them.

Control access

Control removable media

Scan every USB drive before it touches a shipboard or terminal system, use dedicated and controlled media for chart and software updates, and block unknown devices where possible.

Build navigation resilience

Train bridge teams to spot jamming and spoofing: sudden position jumps, impossible speeds, or positions that disagree with radar and visual observations. Use receivers that can use multiple satellite constellations, cross-check positions with radar, depth soundings and visual bearings, and keep traditional navigation skills current. In high-risk areas, plan routes assuming GPS may be unreliable.

Protect the terminal operating system and plan to work without it

Treat the terminal operating system as critical infrastructure: harden it, restrict who can reach it, back it up offline and test restores. Just as important, write and practise manual procedures for gates, yard management and vessel operations, so the terminal can keep moving cargo, even slowly, if it goes down.

Patch what you can, protect what you can't

Update systems during port calls and planned maintenance where possible. For systems that can't be updated, use segmentation, application allowlisting and strict access control to limit the risk.

Monitor ship and shore

Monitor terminal and corporate networks for signs of intrusion, and use tools designed for ships that can detect unusual traffic over satellite links. Feed GNSS interference reports and alerts to both bridge teams and shore operations.

Manage vendors and partners

Assess the security of equipment makers, ship managers, software suppliers and port community system operators. Write security requirements into contracts and limit what each partner can reach.

Fight payment fraud

Verify every change to bank details by phone using a known number, never using contact details in the email asking for the change. Train finance and operations staff to recognise fraud attempts.

Test and assess, carefully

Share threat intelligence

Maritime and port information sharing groups, national cyber security agencies and maritime security centres give early warning of active threats, GNSS interference and attacks on peers. The value comes from contributing as well as receiving.

Use established guidance

Industry guidance such as the BIMCO Guidelines on Cyber Security Onboard Ships and the ISA/IEC 62443 series of standards for industrial systems provide a solid basis for building and measuring a security programme.

7. Incident response for ports and shipping

In the maritime world, the priorities are the safety of people and ships, then keeping cargo moving. Incident response has to cover both ship and shore.

Incident response flow for a port or ship incident
  1. DetectSecurity alert, system failure, crew or staff report
  2. TriageIs vessel or personnel safety at risk? Which terminals and ships are affected?
  3. Switch to manual operations?
    YesDisconnect systems, run gates, yard and navigation manually
    NoIsolate affected systems, keep unaffected operations running
  4. ContainIsolate affected networks and preserve evidence
  5. Eradicate and recoverRebuild from clean backups, reset credentials
  6. Restart safelyPhased restart, reconcile container records, clear the backlog
  7. LearnFix root causes and update playbooks

Playbooks for ship and shore

Write playbooks for the scenarios that matter most: ransomware on the terminal operating system, a compromised port community system, GNSS interference at sea, malware on a ship's systems and payment fraud. Each should say who decides, who acts and who communicates.

The big decision: when to go manual

Disconnecting systems contains an attack but slows or stops operations. Agree in advance who can make that call, what triggers it, and exactly how gates, yards and vessel operations will run manually.

Incidents at sea

A ship may have limited bandwidth, no IT specialist and hours or days until port. Crews need simple, practised steps: switch to independent navigation, isolate affected systems, report to the shore and know who to call for help.

Reconcile before restarting

After an outage, container records may not match what is physically in the yard. Reconcile data before restarting at full speed, or the backlog will grow and containers will go missing.

Communicate

Shipping lines, hauliers, importers, customs and the public all need clear updates about what is open, what is delayed and when operations will recover. Prepare templates and channels in advance.

8. Governance and culture

9. Emerging issues

Automated terminals and smart ports

Automated cranes, driverless vehicles, 5G networks and digital twins make ports more efficient but more dependent on software. A cyber attack on a fully automated terminal can stop it completely.

Autonomous and remotely operated ships

As ships rely more on remote monitoring and, in future, remote control, the shore connection becomes a safety-critical system that must be protected accordingly.

AI on both sides

Attackers use AI to write convincing phishing emails and impersonate business partners in fraud. Defenders use it to spot anomalies in network traffic and vessel behaviour.

Geopolitics at sea

Conflicts in the Middle East, Red Sea and Black Sea have shown how quickly navigation interference and attacks on maritime infrastructure follow political tension. Ports and shipping lines far from the conflict can still be hit.

10. Checklist: 20 questions every port and shipping company should ask

Use these questions to test your current position. Any question you can't answer with a confident yes is a place to start.

Download the checklist (PDF)

Visibility

  1. Do we have a current inventory of the systems on every ship and in every terminal?
  2. Do we know every connection to our ships and terminals, including satellite links and vendor access?
  3. Do we know which shared platforms our operations depend on?

Access

  1. Is multi-factor authentication enforced on all remote access to ships and terminals?
  2. Is vendor access switched on only when needed, and monitored?
  3. Are accounts removed promptly when staff and crew move on?

Network

  1. Are navigation and machinery systems separated from business IT and crew internet on every ship?
  2. Is the terminal operating system separated from corporate IT and partner connections?
  3. Is removable media scanned before it touches shipboard or terminal systems?

Detection

  1. Do we monitor terminal networks and ship traffic for signs of intrusion?
  2. Would our bridge teams recognise GPS jamming or spoofing quickly?
  3. Do GNSS interference warnings reach both ships and shore operations?

Resilience

  1. Are backups of the terminal operating system and key ship systems stored offline and tested?
  2. Could our terminals keep moving cargo manually for several days?
  3. Can our ships navigate safely without GPS in high-risk areas?

Response

  1. Do we have incident response plans covering both ships and terminals?
  2. Have we decided in advance who can order a switch to manual operations?
  3. Have we run an exercise with partners such as shipping lines, hauliers and customs in the last 12 months?

People and governance

  1. Have crews, port staff and finance teams been trained on phishing, removable media and payment fraud?
  2. Does the board receive regular reporting on cyber risk across the fleet and terminals?

Conclusion

The maritime industry has always managed risk at sea through seamanship, procedures and drills. Today, a ransomware attack on a terminal operating system or a spoofed GPS signal can stop a port or put a ship on the rocks as surely as a storm.

The defences are well understood. Know your systems. Separate your networks. Control access, especially from vendors. Don't trust navigation signals blindly. Plan to work manually, and practise it.

In shipping, cyber security is seamanship.

Sources

Build ➜ Hack ➜ Investigate ➜ Secure ➜ Audit

Master the complete cyber lifecycle with the ASCL Certified Cyber360 Professional course.

Explore the Cyber360 course